

That is why last night I joined with several of my colleagues, including Senators LIEBERMAN and BIDEN, to introduce S. Res. 77, a resolution that calls on the administration to devise a comprehensive strategy to confront the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Bush administration's policy to counter proliferation has suffered from inconsistency. It downplays immediate threats, such as North Korea, while emphasizing others. It puts together a coalition against terrorism, but has ignored allies and undercut international action against proliferation. In sum, the administration's actions have served to weaken the effort to establish a robust coalition against proliferation.

Since taking office, the Administration has been deeply ambivalent about U.S. efforts to secure loose Russian nuclear weapons and materials and unemployed nuclear scientists. While focusing on Iraq, it has ignored looming problems elsewhere, such as North Korea and Iran. And rather than seeking ways to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, it pursues doctrines that would effectively lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, further compounding the threat of proliferation.

This is too dangerous a situation to ignore any longer. Our resolution calls for a comprehensive strategy—not unhelpful actions or ad hoc reactions—to confront the threat proliferation presents to American citizens.

Among other proposals, we urge the President to begin to build a coalition against proliferation, immediately and directly engage North Korea, vastly increase the funding for U.S. programs that secure loose nuclear weapons, and deliver sufficient homeland security funds to the state, local and tribal governments so they can prepare their first responders to respond against further terrorist attacks.

The administration tells us that the Moscow Treaty represents a new kind of agreement, one that acknowledges we have emerged fully from the cold war era. We join the President in welcoming this new era.

But we must take this opportunity to create a comprehensive strategy that recognizes we have entered a new and potentially dangerous era of proliferation.

To date the administration has failed in that effort. But we cannot afford to delay any longer.

Time is not on our side. The risks to our security mount with each day that passes without an administration strategy.

Mr. LUGAR. My understanding is the distinguished majority leader has a statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, first of all, I thank Senators Lugar and Biden for their excellent work over the past 2 days. I appreciate their leadership on

this very important Resolution for Ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

The treaty is critically important to making the world a safer place and will lead to dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals. I commend the chairmen. The next vote on the adoption of the Resolution of Ratification will be the last vote of the evening.

In addition, there will be no rollcall votes during tomorrow's session, although the Senate will be in session to allow Members to speak in morning business. Many will be speaking on Iraq. If any Members are interested, I encourage them to come to the floor to do so tomorrow. The next rollcall vote will be on Monday at 6 p.m.

I thank all Senators for their attention.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Resolution of Ratification.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

Is there further debate?

If not, the question is on agreeing to the Resolution of Ratification with conditions and declarations to Calendar No. 1, Treaty Document No. 107-8, the Moscow Treaty. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. FRIST. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. MCCONNELL), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. SMITH) are necessarily absent.

Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. GRAHAM) and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. MILLER) are necessarily absent.

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 95, nays 0, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 43 Ex.]

YEAS—95

Akaka	DeWine	Lieberman
Alexander	Dodd	Lincoln
Allard	Dole	Lott
Allen	Dorgan	Lugar
Baucus	Durbin	McCain
Bayh	Edwards	Mikulski
Bennett	Ensign	Murkowski
Biden	Enzi	Murray
Bingaman	Feingold	Nelson (FL)
Bond	Feinstein	Nelson (NE)
Boxer	Fitzgerald	Nickles
Breaux	Frist	Pryor
Brownback	Graham (SC)	Reed
Bunning	Grassley	Reid
Burns	Gregg	Roberts
Byrd	Hagel	Rockefeller
Campbell	Harkin	Santorum
Cantwell	Hatch	Sarbanes
Carper	Hollings	Schumer
Chafee	Hutchison	Sessions
Chambliss	Inhofe	Shelby
Clinton	Inouye	Snowe
Cochran	Jeffords	Specter
Coleman	Johnson	Stabenow
Collins	Kennedy	Stevens
Conrad	Kerry	Sununu
Cornyn	Kohl	Talent
Corzine	Kyl	Thomas
Craig	Landrieu	Voinovich
Crapo	Lautenberg	Warner
Daschle	Leahy	Wyden
Dayton	Levin	

NOT VOTING—5

Domenici	McConnell	Smith
Graham (FL)	Miller	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the Resolution of Ratification is agreed to.

The Resolution of Ratification agreed to is as follows:

Resolved, (two thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND DECLARATIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (T. Doc. 107-8, in this resolution referred to as the "Moscow Treaty" or "Treaty"), subject to the conditions in section 2 and declarations in section 3.

SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding on the President:

(1) REPORT ON THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE. Recognizing that implementation of the Moscow Treaty is the sole responsibility of each party, not later than 60 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on February 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report and recommendations on how United States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the Russian Federation can best contribute to enabling the Russian Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material in the current year. The report shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, classified form. (2) Annual implementation report. Not later than 60 days after exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on implementation of the Treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation. This report shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, classified form and shall include

(A) a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States, and a best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation, as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year;

(B) a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year;

(C) to the extent possible, the plans of each party for achieving by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

(D) measures, including any verification or transparency measures, that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to assure each party of the other party's continued intent and ability to achieve by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

(E) information relevant to implementation of this Treaty that has been learned as a result of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) verification measures, and the status of consideration of extending the START verification regime beyond December 2009;

(F) any information, insufficiency of information, or other situation that may call into